Irakul, Afganistanul şi Romanistanul
Înlocuirea generelului McCristal cu generalul Petraeus la comanda forţelor militare americane în Irak nu a adus cine ştie ce îmbunătăţiri simţitoare pe teatrele de operaţiuni. Ce să se mai întîmple în ultimul moment ? Situaţia în teren este complexă şi fără sorţi de izbîndă definitivă. Războiul dus cu tehnologii avansate – ca şi în Coreea, ca şi în Vietnam,ca şi în Irak sau Afganistan americanii au avut un net avantaj – s-a împotmolit într-unul de uzură. Deja e clar că luptele om la om nu au putut elimina luptătorii de guerilă irakieni sau pe talibanii afgani şi întreaga operaţiune militară de anvergură este acum măcinată de incidente locale. La ce a dus ocuparea Irakului? Cu ce preţ, cu ce costuri umane, cu ce soluţii pentru viitorul imediat? Dincolo de afacerile lui Donald Rumsfeld şi gologanii păpaţi de Helliborton. Au şi americanii asfaltangii lor, nici la ei iarna nu-i ca vara.
by Scott Stantis, 2009
Ce zice Congresul ? Dar opinia publică, dar strategii de la Pentagon şi analiştii de la Departamentul de Stat? Deja Preşedintele Barack Obama a declarat retragerea trupelor combatante americane de pe teatrele de operaţiuni începînd cu 1 septembrie. Este clar că soldaţii americanii au deja bagajele făcute şi masivele avioane Hercules vor duce acasă zeci de mii de militari. Deja Preşedintele Barack Obama a declarat că pînă la sfîrşitul anului viitor nu vor mai fi soldaţi americani pe teritoriul irakian. Totuşi un corp expediţionar de încă 50 000 de soldaţi americani non combat vor fi prezenţi încă un an în Irak. Retragerea definitivă va fi abia peste un an. Sună frumos şi în mod cert aşa va fi. Ce se va întîmpla şi cum va continua lupta împotriva terorismului după încetarea intervenţiei militare NATO în Irak şi Afganistan? Britanicii se pregătesc şi ei de retragere. În ultimele zile, ca un făcut, 8 soldaţi americani şi 4 britanici au fost ucişi. Ceea nu sună bine şi nici încurajator. Ce se va întîmpla la Basra, Falujah, Tikrit sau Bagdad după retragerea definitivă a militarilor NATO? Vor începe iar lupte intestine între suniţi, şiiţi şi kurzii din nord? Ce fel de democraţie, pace şi prosperitate rămîne în Irak după plecarea americanilor? Greu de făcut evaluări corecte. Dar cu militarii români ce se întîmplă? Noi decidem dacă retragem ostaşii noştri sau decid americanii? Dacă ar fi după noi, s-ar găsi destui ca să şi meargă şi acum, dacă ar fi de cîştigat bani. E bine, e rău, banu-i ban şi banul la ban trage. Dacă nu moare sau nu e nici un soldat român rănit, atunci este bine. Şi toată lumea e fericită, noi că suntem alături de americani – nu doream asta de zeci de ani ? –, cîteva sute de familii româneşti frecîndu-şi mâinile că mai vin nişte dolari şi vor avea ce să cheltuiască în vremurile astea de restrişte. Dacă rromii trimişi înapoi din Franţa au primit cîte 300 euro de căciulă şi 100 de euro de [copil], militarii vin cu mult mai mulţi bani. Toată chestia e bine, Doamne ajută şi toata lumea e fericită pînă se întîmplă vreo nenorocire, Doamne fereşte, cu o mină sau vreo rafală de Kalaşnikov. Dar, în fine, la război, ca la război.
Totuşi, ce se va întîmpla în continuare? Putem face oarece speculaţii.
Turcii joacă o carte nouă în Orientul Mijlociu. Israelienii nu privesc cu ochi buni nici ce se întîmplă la Ankara, nici la Teheran. Iranienii rămîn în continuare o ameninţare la securitatea lumii, nu are rost să ne ascundem după vorbe sau cireş. Islamul a devenit agresiv şi intoleranţa afişată nu poate duce la nimic bun. Nu putem ignora femeia lapidată ca în evul mediu sau acele imagini îngrozitoare cu o tînără iraniană cu nasul şi urechea tăiate. Sinistru. Suntem în secolul XXI şi nu pe vremea lui Aladin! Ruşii s-au înfipt şi ei iar tare în Iran şi Armenia. Prezenţa a mii de soldaţi ruşi la Gumri (baza rusească în Armenia, închiriată recent pe încă 50 de ani) cu rachete sol-aer şi Mig 29 în dotare poate tăia avînturile belicoase ale azerilor. […] În Caucaz treburile rămîn încîlcite. În Iran, unde buba cea mare: specialiştii ruşi au fost alături de cei iranieni la încărcarea reactoarelor. Ar putea ataca aviaţia israeliană (cum a procedat în Siria) sau cea americană (cum a procedat în Libia) obiective iraniene acolo unde sunt şi militari/experţi ruşi? Puţin probabil. NATO, americanii şi israelienii vor trebui să privească şi să gestioneze extrem de atent acest complex dosar iranian.
Pentru ai noştri însă, doar chestiunea rromilor din Franţa şi cea basarabeană par de mare actualitate. Nu ne este indiferent cum vor evolua lucrurile la Chişinău. Chiar dacă ruşii îşi încordează muşchii şi nu privesc cu ochi buni ce se întîmplă acolo. Apropierea Moldovei de România şi UE, atît de dorită de actuala conducere de la Chişinău – dar şi de cei de la Bucureşti, sotto voce – ar fi benefică pentru viitorul românilor. Dincolo de actualele graniţe. E bine să ştim cum să acţionăm cu eficienţă şi pragmatism. Măcar în chestiunea Moldovei să fim inteligenţi, dacă în cazul altor dosare externe am pus-o de mămăligă. Totuşi o întrebare rămîne. Cînd revin în ţară trupele române din Irak? Şi cu scutul antirachetă cum rămâne? Iată că sunt două întrebări.
Trăim în Romanistan şi o să trăim şi mai bine. Cică.
– text publicat în săptămînalul Observator cultural, septembrie a.c.
22/febr/2010 O critică a politicii (externe şi interne) a administraţiei B. Obama – din partea unui votant al ei
Prezentăm acest text ca fiind exponenţial pentru o critică la adresa lui Barack Obama din perspectiva stângii (democrate) americane. În opinia noastră, nu toate argumentele de mai jos se susţin prin ele însele – dar sunt reprezentative pentru o anumită stare de spirit din societatea americană contemporană – EURAST.
Conversation with Daniel Ellsberg: Evaluating Obama So Far
By Joan Brunwasser
Daniel Ellsberg is definitely a name out of our national past. Baby Boomers immediately conjure up images of the Vietnam War and the Pentagon Papers. For the younger set, or those whose recollections have faded, there’s a brand new documentary about Ellsberg and his historic actions. The Most Dangerous Man in America opened in theaters across the country this past weekend and is guaranteed to bring you up to speed. In it, whistleblower and activist Ellsberg is both star and narrator. Welcome to OpEdNews, Dan. If you don’t mind, we’ll come back to the documentary later. I’d like to hear your take on current events. We are now officially one year into this new administration. Are we on the way to achieving the change that the voters were so eager for?
On Afghanistan, there is change: for the worse, much worse. Not just a tripling of the American troop presence, though that’s bad enough. I believe that’s just the start of an open-ended, indefinitely prolonged fighting occupation.
Some of my friends and a large part of the public, perhaps most, believe that he’s committed himself to put a ceiling on the American troop presence of about 100,000. They realize that his officials quickly backed away from his talk in December of beginning to withdraw then, but they think he won’t go above the level reached by this „one-time” deployment (which will be closer to 40,000 than his announced 30,000).
I believe that’s mistaken. I expect that no later than his 18-24-month „deadline” and probably much earlier than that, General McChrystal will be asking for a lot more troops. And I now expect Obama to give them to him (if and when troops become available from Iraq, and perhaps elsewhere as necessary).
A president who didn’t say „No” to this recent request–the best chance he’ll ever have to do so, when he could still blame a hopeless situation on the last eight years under his predecessor and „reluctantly” name a date for total withdrawal–will find it even harder to do after wasting more lives in coming months. The odds are very high, I believe, that Obama’s War will last as long as he’s in the White House–whether four or eight years–and beyond.
Pakistan: his expanded drone campaign. Change for the worse. Those civilian-killing violations of sovereignty and pressures on Pakistan to go on offensives they don’t want to do against the various Talibans in their country seem recklessly destabilizing of that dangerous regime.
Iraq: I flatly do not believe that he has ever had any intention to give up permanent bases, manned by tens of thousands of US troops and mercenaries. Nor do I expect an end to Iraqi efforts to dislodge them, meaning continued dying and especially killing–mainly from the air–by US troops, indefinitely. If and when he reduces up to a hundred thousand of our troops in Iraq, I expect them to go to Afghanistan, after a visit home with their families.
On repairing the erosion of the Constitution over the last eight years, undoing the executive coup under Bush/Cheney? No change. Rendition (kidnapping „suspects” to torture states), state secrets privilege invoked on the same grounds and as frequently as before, no more transparency (yet: there’s still talk of it, but I’m not holding my breath); warrantless wiretapping and surveillance untrammeled, with telephone companies as immune to accountability as NSA, assertion of right and intention of indefinite detention without charges or trial (continuing the Bush Administration’s rejection of the Magna Carta).
I didn’t really expect a president to eschew powers bequeathed to him by his predecessor, without Congressional pressure (which he wasn’t likely to get from a Congress dominated by his own party: and he hasn’t). But the use all year of the same briefs used by the Bush DOJ mocking the Constitution! We have to remember that John Yoo was (and is) a teacher of constitutional law, too; that doesn’t seem to do much for us. And for a guy who recited the presidential oath of office twice, I was struck that he misstated in Sweden what it was he had sworn to.
His excuse for accepting a Peace Prize while he was conducting four wars (including covert wars in Yemen and Pakistan: and Somalia? Iran?) was that unlike Martin Luther King and Gandhi he lived in the real world (not the bubble of the Birmingham Jail or the Salt March) and that he had „sworn to defend his nation.” Actually, he hadn’t. Like all presidents, he had sworn to protect, preserve and defend „the Constitution of the United States” against „all enemies foreign and domestic.” He hasn’t done a very good job of that, failing to reverse or even investigate the effective assaults on it of his predecessors Bush and Cheney, fairly described, I believe, as domestic enemies of the Constitution.
Obama has the chutzpah to assert that „I closed Guantanamo„–when he hasn’t! And if and when he does, he intends to move the lawless detention regime to Illinois. In the same sentence he claimed that he’s ended torture: when there are credible accounts of torture still going on at JSOC sites at Bagram and elsewhere.
Meanwhile he has, in effect, decriminalized torture, by refusing to indict, prosecute or even investigate the blatant policy of it under his predecessor. He says he’s stopped it, but his refusal to regard it as something to be investigated and prosecuted (which is his legal obligation to do under a treaty: i.e., he’s in violation of this) identifies it as something other than a crime, which it is under both domestic and international law. In other words, not only his successors but he himself could turn to it next month if „new” circumstances changed his judgment of its necessity as an instrument of policy. And as Glenn Greenwald has pointed out, for Obama to take this position makes it a bipartisan consensus (like the other constitutional atrocities mentioned above), giving it a seal of legitimacy and status from now on as an available „option” for the Executive branch.
The economy? Health? He has sought and achieved all the change that Wall Street and the health industry will accept and applaud.
His „changes” have made his favorite bankers rich, and will vastly enrich the health industry, without demanding regulation. Hardly surprising on the financial sector, since he appointed as top officials and advisors the very promoters of deregulation that created the crisis. The administration attitude that „What’s good for Goldman Sachs is good for the nation” is not the change most people were eager for.
I hear there have been some useful changes in civil rights and the environment (other than a real policy for averting climate catastrophe!) but I don’t know the specifics. On the issues I follow closely, it’s a another Bush term: at its best, Bush the father, but mostly the son. The rhetoric is different, for sure, but it’s so uncoupled from performance that I scarcely listen to the talk any more.
Yes, there still is a dime’s worth of difference between the parties–though not a whole lot more than that–but at this point, I wouldn’t give a dime for the rhetoric alone. If he backs up his words about a „nuclear -free world” with meaningful steps in that direction, I’ll give him credit for it: but he hasn’t done so yet, and I really don’t expect it. Looking at the Republicans, I can hardly regret my vote and support for him, and I will surely vote for him in 2012. But not because I expect from him the change we need: in the absence of a yet-nonexistent citizens’ movement that will change the political environment to which he responds.
Certainly in style, and in some respects in policy, he’s far from being a Bush-type Republican. But he’s just as far from what we need as he is from McCain and Palin.
A thorough answer but hardly a rave review, I’m afraid. Let’s pause here. When we return, Dan will talk more about the Pentagon Papers and how much things are different, or not, today. I hope you’ll join us.
Joan Brunwasser is a co-founder of Citizens for Election Reform (CER).
14/ian/2010 EURAST recomandă: Z. Brzezinski face analiza geopolitică a politicii externe a a primului an de mandat Obama (4/6). SUA şi capcana Afganistan & Pakistan
(În ultimul număr (ianuarie-februarie 2010 al revistei Foreign Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski (consilier de securitate al preşedinţilor SUA între 1977 şi 1981) face un bilanţ al primului an al administraţiei Barack Obama din punctul de vedere al liniilor de politică externă urmărite. Vom relua aici acest text în integralitate, în serial. Astăzi, despre capcana din Afganistan & Pakistan – EURAST)
From Hope to Audacity
Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy (IV)
Foreign Affairs /// January/February 2010
THE AFPAK QUAGMIRE
The third urgent and politically sensitive foreign policy issue is posed by the Afghan-Pakistani predicament. Obama has moved toward abandoning some of the more ambitious, even ideological, objectives that defined the United States’ initial engagement in Afghanistan – the creation of a modern democracy, for example. But the United States must be very careful lest its engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which still has primarily and most visibly a military dimension, comes to be viewed by the Afghans and the Pakistanis as yet another case of Western colonialism and elicits from them an increasingly militant response.
Some top U.S. generals have recently stated that the United States is not winning militarily, an appraisal that ominously suggests the conflict with the Taliban could become similar to the Soviet Union’s earlier confrontation with Afghan resistance. A comprehensive strategic reassessment has thus become urgently needed. The proposal made in September by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom for an international conference on the subject was helpful and timely; the United States was wise to welcome it. But to be effective, any new strategy has to emphasize two key elements. First, the Afghan government and NATO should seek to engage locally in a limited process of accommodation with receptive elements of the Taliban. The Taliban are not a global revolutionary or terrorist movement, and although they are a broad alliance with a rather medieval vision of what Afghanistan ought to be, they do not directly threaten the West. Moreover, they are still very much a minority phenomenon that ultimately can be defeated only by other Afghans (helped economically and militarily by the United States and its NATO allies), a fact that demands a strategy that is more political than military.
Additionally, the United States needs to develop a policy for gaining the support of Pakistan, not just in denying the Taliban a sanctuary in Pakistan but also in pressuring the Taliban in Afghanistan to accommodate. Given that many Pakistanis may prefer a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to a secular Afghanistan that leans toward Pakistan’s archrival, India, the United States needs to assuage Pakistan’s security concerns in order to gain its full cooperation in the campaign against the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban. In this regard, the support of China could be helpful, particularly considering its geopolitical stake in regional stability and its traditionally close ties with Islamabad.
It is likely that before this appraisal hits the newsstands, Obama will have announced a more comprehensive strategy for attaining a politically acceptable outcome to the ongoing conflict – and one that U.S. allies are also prepared to support. His approach so far has been deliberate. He has been careful to assess both the military and the political dimensions of the challenge and also to take into account the views of U.S. allies. Nothing would be worse for NATO than if one part of the alliance (western Europe) left the other part of the alliance (the United States) alone in Afghanistan. Such a fissure over NATO’s first campaign initially based on Article 5, the collective defense provision, would probably spell the end of the alliance.
How Obama handles these three urgent and interrelated issues – the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Iranian dilemma, and the Afghan-Pakistani conflict – will determine the United States’ global role for the foreseeable future. The consequences of a failed peace process in the Middle East, a military collision with Iran, and an intensifying military engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan all happening simultaneously could commit the United States for many years to a lonely and self-destructive conflict in a huge and volatile area. Eventually, that could spell the end of the United States’ current global preeminence.
Susan Glasser vorbeşte despre cuprinsul celui mai recent număr al revistei Foreign Policy, precum şi despre câteva teme tangenţiale, precum: competiţia dintre Canada şi Rusia pentru resursele nordice, situaţia din Afganistan, situaţia internă din Rusia condusă de Putin & Medvedev sau politica de „resetare” a relaţiilor dintre SUA şi Rusia, promovată de administraţia Obama.
(nota EURAST: ediţia română a acestui număr al revistei Foreign Policy apare pe 18 ianuarie a.c.)
Editor Of ‘Foreign Policy’ Talks About
The Stories You Should Have Been Paying Attention To
RFE/RL, January 01, 2010
News organizations around the world have been looking at 2009’s most important trends and events. RFE/RL correspondent Gregory Feifer recently sat down with Susan Glasser, executive editor of „Foreign Policy” magazine, for her perspective. An influential voice in the U.S. foreign policy community, Glasser was previously assistant managing editor for national news at „The Washington Post.” Earlier, she served as Moscow correspondent for the paper, together with her husband, Peter Baker. They co-wrote „Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution.”
RFE/RL: „Foreign Policy” recently published a feature on the Top 10 Overlooked Stories of 2009. The two at the top of the list were the opening of Russia’s arctic Northeast Passage and the resurgence of violence in Iraq. Can you explain why?
Susan Glasser: What we were aiming to do was to look at the stories, not that went unreported entirely, but that really escaped broad general notice because often those are the stories that have the bigger long-term impact. Those are the stories that you might be reading a whole lot more about in 2010. , frankly, [was] so overwhelmingly and understandably dominated by a few big news stories: President Obama’s first year, then the health-care fight, the war in Afghanistan, the ongoing turmoil after the election in Iran. These are understandably the big news stories of 2009. So what we do every year is make a tradition out of searching out those big, very impactful things that you might not have heard as much about.
– text integral, în format word doc. – RFERL – interviu Glasser – 01 ian 10
(just for fun!)
by Nick Anderson 01 dec 09
Preşedintele Karzai: „Alegerile din Afganistan au fost un succes! Pentru moment, am înregistrat mai mulţi votanţi decât morţi!”
Dessin de Kap paru dans La Vanguardia
(just for fun!)
28/dec/2009 În curînd, un (alt) interviu bombă din ziarul „La Vanguardia” (să fie vorba tot de Patapievici?)!
… mâine, 29 decembrie a.c., ora 13.05, ziarul La Vanguardia aduce aici o informaţie explozivă despre geopolitica Orientului Mijlociu (SUA, Afganistan y compris)!
(just for fun!)
by Ed Stein 01 dec 09
by Bill Day 08 dec 09
by Bill Day 02 dec 09
(Un text marca Foreign Affairs despre lecţiile pe care eşecul sovieticilor în Afganistan, după 1979, le-ar putea da astăzi într-un conflict a cărui soartă pare în cumpănă. Pe această temă, EURAST mai recomandă: strategia propusă de administraţia Obama; interviu cu Henry Kissinger).
The Soviet Victory That Never Was
What the United States Can Learn From the Soviet War in Afghanistan
Nikolas K. Gvosdev
December 10, 2009
Summary – The Soviet Union came closer than many think to achieving its objectives in Afghanistan. How it almost managed to win – and why it ultimately did not – should serve as a lesson for U.S. policymakers today.
NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV is Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College. The views expressed herein are entirely his own.
Could the Soviet Union have won its war in Afghanistan? Today, the victory of the anti-Soviet mujahideen seems preordained as part of the West’s ultimate triumph in the Cold War. To suggest that an alternative outcome was possible – and that the United States has something to learn from the Soviet Union’s experience in Afghanistan – may be controversial. But to avoid being similarly frustrated by the infamous “graveyard of empires,” U.S. military planners would be wise to study how the Soviet Union nearly emerged triumphant from its decade-long war.
There are, of course, some fundamental differences between the Soviets’ war in the 1980s and the U.S.-led mission today. First, the Soviet Union intervened to save a communist regime which was in danger of collapsing due to resistance to its comprehensive and often traumatic social-engineering programs. Unlike the Soviets and their client regime, the United States is not interested in forcibly removing the burkas from Afghan women, shooting large numbers of mullahs for resisting secularization, or reprogramming the political and social mores of Afghans. Instead, Washington has a far more limited objective: namely, ensuring that Afghanistan remains an inhospitable base for extremist groups hoping to attack the West.
Second, the Soviet army was prepared to fight a total war in Afghanistan, taking heavy losses in men and machinery and inflicting sweeping violence on the Afghan people. No U.S. commander would be willing to wage such a war today; the U.S. military realizes that making a desert and calling it peace is no way to curtail an insurgency.
But the Soviet experience should not be entirely ignored. When Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan in February 1989, many in the United States expected to see the mujahideen quickly topple the pro-Moscow government in Kabul. This did not happen. The regime led by Mohammad Najibullah, whom Moscow installed as president in 1987, remained in control of the country. For a moment, it appeared as if the Kremlin had successfully left in power an Afghan government and army that could withstand the Soviet withdrawal.
For a moment, it appeared as if the Kremlin had successfully left in power an Afghan government and army that could withstand the Soviet withdrawal. The Najibullah government was able to survive because Najibullah recognized the futility of the earlier Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. Afghans, he knew, would not fight and die for the Soviet Union. But, he realized, Afghans could be co-opted to work with the government to defend local and clan interests. Najibullah allowed regional leaders – and, in some cases, former mujahideen commanders – to form their own militias and, with mixed results, to join the regular army. The most successful of these was the Uzbek militia led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, which formed the 53rd infantry division of the Afghan army.
The departure of Soviet troops – “the foreigners” – weakened ties among various mujahideen factions. Najibullah’s government used long-standing rivalries, along with selective and generous bribery, to drive wedges between militant groups and then take advantage of the fighting that broke out as a result. At the same time, Najibullah received weaponry, food, and fuel from the Soviets, which gave his forces a significant advantage in terms of battlefield firepower and resources. The Afghan military flew the latest Soviet aircraft and had hundreds of Soviet-made Scud missiles in its arsenal. (text integral word doc. – Gvosdev – Afganistan – FAff dec 09 )
_______click pe imagine pentru o rezoluţie mai bună; by Bill Day 17 nov 09
Soluţia administraţiei Obama privind campania din Afganistan
Ieri, 1 decembrie a.c., într-un discurs programat a devoala soluţia administraţiei Obama la problemele din Afganistan, preşedintele SUA a anunţat dimensiunile de perspectivă ale „efortului american” în zonă: sporirea cu 30.000 de oameni a corpurilor armate americane şi, în speranţa unei evoluţii pozitive a campaniei, posibilitatea retragerii din zonă, după o perioadă de timp de minimum 18 luni (în iulie 2011). După ce a făcut o introducere „istorică” a dosarului afgan (începînd de la ziua fatidică de 11 septembrie 2001), precizînd că aceste eforturi din Afganistan şi Pakistan sînt „în interesul vital al Americii”, preşedintele Barack Obama a spus că trupele americane din Afganistan vor spori numeric spre 100.000 de oameni în primăvara anului 2010, iar forţele aliaţilor din NATO vor creşte de la nivelul actual (40 000 de oameni) spre 45-50 000. În context fie spus, este de aşteptat ca şi România – odată încheiate aceste alegeri prezidenţiale – să pună în discuţie o eventuală sporire a prezenţei sale în Afganistan. (Adrian Cioroianu)
* * *
The text of President Barack Obama’s speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point on December 1, as issued by the White House
“Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our Armed Services, and to my fellow Americans: I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan — the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion. It’s an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point — where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.
To address these important issues, it’s important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station. Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.
As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda — a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda’s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban — a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.
Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them — an authorization that continues to this day. (text integral)
(click pe imagine pentru o rezoluţie mai bună)
by Kal, The Economist 26 nov 09
H. Kissinger: mutaţii geopolitice ale prezentului (China, Japonia, Rusia etc.)
Întors dintr-o călătorie în China via Paris, Henry Kissinger (fost secretar de stat în administraţiile Nixon şi Ford, artizan al deschiderii SUA către China la începutul anilor 70 etc.) a acordat un interviu revelator pentru interpretarea pe care el o dă ultimelor evoluţii pe plan internaţional.
Una dintre cele mai importante schimbări de natură globală i se pare a fi noua poziţie a Chinei faţă de dominaţia dolarului pe piaţa financiară a lumii. În analiza lui Kissinger, chinezii au fost dezamăgiţi de maniera în care instituţiile americane generic denumite Wall Street au reacţionat în faţa acestei crize de acum. Încrederea chinezilor în finanţele americane şi în dolarul american au scăzut şi, din acest punct de vedere, „nimic nu va mai fi precum înainte” – spune Kissinger.
O altă schimbare importantă i se pare a se produce în Japonia. Confirmînd, în parte, aserţiunile lui Samuel Huntington (făcute la mijlocul anilor 90) referitoare la faptul că într-un viitor apropiat Japonia se va orienta mai mult către China şi va accepta înlocuirea influenţei americane cu o influenţă chineză în Asia, Kissinger atrage atenţia că, deja, noul guvern japonez a anunţat cîteva măsuri (precum retragerea ajutorului militar japonez pentru războiul din Afganistan, repunerea în discuţie a statutului bazelor americane din Okinawa) care nu trebuie subestimate. „Perioada în care Japonia se poziţiona necondiţionat în spatele Americii mi se pare de domeniul trecutului” – spune Kissinger.
În legătură cu Rusia, Kissinger crede că administraţiile americane de după 1990 au greşit pentru că au subestimat „umilinţa pe care elita şi populaţia Rusiei au simţit-o odată cu prăbuşirea Uniunii Sovietice”. În context, el apreciază politica administraţiei Obama de a reiniţia „un dialog de la egal la egal” cu Rusia – dar aceasta nu înseamnă că trebuie acceptate excesele Rusiei, precum războiul şi politica faţă de Georgia după 2008.
Kissinger mai comentează cu acelaşi prilej noile evoluţii în „dosarul nuclear iranian„, noua strategie pentru Afganistan, gîndirea geopolitică a Franţei etc. (text integral)