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Spectacolul ideilor pe hartă

14/ian/2010 Istoria, memoria (şi politica!) genocidului armean

Genocidul armean

 Bedros Horasangian

Se împlinesc anul acesta, suntem în 2010 deja, 95 de ani de la Genocidul Armean din 1915.

Este un moment tragic în istoria unei naţiuni, este un punct de cotitură în destinul unui popor. Au mai fost evenimente dramatice în istoria lumii, în istoria armenilor în particular, dar un astfel de eveniment marchează, pe durata lungă a istoriei, configuraţia întregii umanităţi. Există deja, pe lângă nenumăratele colecţii de documente de arhivă publicate în ultima sută de ani, şi numeroase studii şi cercetări aprofundate care să decodeze întîmplările. Şi să pună în lumină întunericul unor fapte abominabile.

Nu doar despre „Marea Catastrofă” din 1915 este vorba. Generaţia bunicilor noştri utiliza termenul „Axor”. Unii erau copii la acea dată, alţii adolescenţi, trăiseră direct acel drum al morţii către Deyr-el-Zor din deşertul sirian sau aflaseră, ştiau totul din cele povestite. Din familiile lor decimate sau din ale altora. In 1915 a fi armean era să fii un om mort. Nu  s-a putut duce pînă la capăt acest proiect sinistru, dar preţul plătit a fost oricum extrem de mare. Dintre supravieţuitori puţini erau cei dispuşi să vorbească. Dintre urmaşii supravieţuitorilor puţini îşi mai puteau permite să scotocească în trecut cînd ei erau obligaţi să se acomodeze cu prezentul şi să ia viaţa de la început. Şi nu acasă, la casele lor, ci pe unde apucaseră să fugă. Din casele lor. Casă („dun”) şi Patrie („hairenik”) au devenit locurile pe unde au ajuns să-şi clădească noi locuinţe şi să întemeieze noi familii. Viaţa îşi urma cursul ei inalienabil. Mii, zeci, sute de mii de destine luate din nou de la capăt. Sunt poveşti şi istorii care nu intră în cărţile de poveşti şi în cele de istorie. (continuarea, în format word doc.Horasangian – genocidul armean – ian 10 )

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Stairs – din „Foreign Affairs”, ian-febr. 10 

Reclame

14 ianuarie 2010 Posted by | Intelo, Istorie | , , , , | Lasă un comentariu

14/ian/2010 EURAST recomandă: Z. Brzezinski face analiza geopolitică a politicii externe a a primului an de mandat Obama (4/6). SUA şi capcana Afganistan & Pakistan

(În ultimul număr (ianuarie-februarie 2010 al revistei Foreign Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski (consilier de securitate al preşedinţilor SUA între 1977 şi 1981) face un bilanţ al primului an al administraţiei Barack Obama din punctul de vedere al liniilor de politică externă urmărite. Vom relua aici acest text în integralitate, în serial. Astăzi, despre capcana din Afganistan & PakistanEURAST)

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From Hope to Audacity

Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy (IV)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Foreign Affairs /// January/February 2010

THE AFPAK QUAGMIRE

The third urgent and politically sensitive foreign policy issue is posed by the Afghan-Pakistani predicament. Obama has moved toward abandoning some of the more ambitious, even ideological, objectives that defined the United States’ initial engagement in Afghanistan – the creation of a modern democracy, for example. But the United States must be very careful lest its engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which still has primarily and most visibly a military dimension, comes to be viewed by the Afghans and the Pakistanis as yet another case of Western colonialism and elicits from them an increasingly militant response.

Some top U.S. generals have recently stated that the United States is not winning militarily, an appraisal that ominously suggests the conflict with the Taliban could become similar to the Soviet Union’s earlier confrontation with Afghan resistance. A comprehensive strategic reassessment has thus become urgently needed. The proposal made in September by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom for an international conference on the subject was helpful and timely; the United States was wise to welcome it. But to be effective, any new strategy has to emphasize two key elements. First, the Afghan government and NATO should seek to engage locally in a limited process of accommodation with receptive elements of the Taliban. The Taliban are not a global revolutionary or terrorist movement, and although they are a broad alliance with a rather medieval vision of what Afghanistan ought to be, they do not directly threaten the West. Moreover, they are still very much a minority phenomenon that ultimately can be defeated only by other Afghans (helped economically and militarily by the United States and its NATO allies), a fact that demands a strategy that is more political than military.

Additionally, the United States needs to develop a policy for gaining the support of Pakistan, not just in denying the Taliban a sanctuary in Pakistan but also in pressuring the Taliban in Afghanistan to accommodate. Given that many Pakistanis may prefer a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to a secular Afghanistan that leans toward Pakistan’s archrival, India, the United States needs to assuage Pakistan’s security concerns in order to gain its full cooperation in the campaign against the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban. In this regard, the support of China could be helpful, particularly considering its geopolitical stake in regional stability and its traditionally close ties with Islamabad.

It is likely that before this appraisal hits the newsstands, Obama will have announced a more comprehensive strategy for attaining a politically acceptable outcome to the ongoing conflict – and one that U.S. allies are also prepared to support. His approach so far has been deliberate. He has been careful to assess both the military and the political dimensions of the challenge and also to take into account the views of U.S. allies. Nothing would be worse for NATO than if one part of the alliance (western Europe) left the other part of the alliance (the United States) alone in Afghanistan. Such a fissure over NATO’s first campaign initially based on Article 5, the collective defense provision, would probably spell the end of the alliance.

How Obama handles these three urgent and interrelated issues – the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Iranian dilemma, and the Afghan-Pakistani conflict – will determine the United States’ global role for the foreseeable future. The consequences of a failed peace process in the Middle East, a military collision with Iran, and an intensifying military engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan all happening simultaneously could commit the United States for many years to a lonely and self-destructive conflict in a huge and volatile area. Eventually, that could spell the end of the United States’ current global preeminence.

14 ianuarie 2010 Posted by | Bibliografii, Geopolitica, Intelo, Istorie | , , , , , | Lasă un comentariu