Spectacolul ideilor pe hartă

02/dec/2009 EURAST recomandă o excelentă analiză: Vl. Socor – Cum „pescuieşte” Rusia în apele politicii de la Chişinău


by Vladimir Socor  

(The Jamestown Foudation, December 1th, 2009)

Moldova’s parliament, a product of the repeat elections in July and deadlocked since then, has scheduled its fourth official attempt this year (technically the fifth attempt) to elect a head of state for December 7.

The governing Alliance for European Integration (AEI) officially supports Marian Lupu, leader of the Democratic Party (third-largest in the four-party Alliance) as its collective candidate for head of state. However, Lupu has gone far in courting Russian support and risks being abandoned by the AEI. Unofficially, some AEI factions are considering ways to scuttle Lupu’s candidacy. The nominally Communist opposition has refused to designate a candidate thus far. The Communists, in power from 2001 to 2009, hold more than enough seats to block the election of the head of state in parliament and force new parliamentary elections.

While the tug-of-war between the Communists and the AEI captures public attention, a parallel contest is ongoing within the AEI itself. Behind the Alliance’s façade of unity, certain leaders have not conclusively given up their own presidential ambitions, which they had seemed to renounce when nominating Lupu as joint candidate. With the presidential election turning into a long-drawn-out process, and Lupu’s chances consequently looking more uncertain, internal rivalries are recrudescing in the AEI.

The incumbent prime minister, Vlad Filat (Liberal-Democrat Party leader), and the leader of Moldova Noastra (AEI’s smallest party) Serafim Urecheanu, had announced their presidential ambitions prior to AEI’s nomination of Lupu. The parliament’s incumbent chairman and acting head of state, Mihai Ghimpu, has repeatedly announced his readiness to continue as acting head of state for as long as necessary to change the constitution.

The gathering threats to Lupu’s candidacy have forced him to seek Russian and local Communist support (see EDM, November 4, 30). Lupu unveiled his predicament publicly for the first time in his November 24 news conference. Alluding to „differing positions and voices [within the AEI] regarding the presidential election”, he could not predict „whether these would unify or would divide even further.” Lupu warned against the intractable situation that would result „if the principles, adopted at the Alliance’s foundation [i.e, the presidential nomination], are not respected.” If the presidential election fails again and new parliamentary elections are held, Lupu said, the Democratic Party might run separately from the other AEI parties, seeking „ideologically compatible” allies in and out of parliament (Moldpres, November 24). He went on to characterize Moldova’s nominal Communist Party as largely compatible (Timpul, November 30, citing Pro-TV, November 27).

Concurrently, Lupu has proposed a 12-point platform for cooperation with the opposition Communist Party. Initiated by him and said by him to carry AEI’s endorsment, the platform is subject to further negotiation with the Communist Party, as a possible basis for Lupu’s election as president with that party’s support (Basapress, NewsIn, November 25).

Lupu’s AEI rivals have seized this opportunity to threaten his candidacy openly. On November 30 the Chisinau newspaper „Timpul,” closely linked with Filat’s Liberal-Democrat Party, vehemently attacked Lupu’s platform and sharply questioned whether it carried the AEI’s endorsment. The attack focuses on perennial, emotional issues of national identity. It rejects the Lupu platform’s planks about „creating conditions for ethnic groups’ active participation in political life,” „a balanced approach to the teaching of history,” and „combating irredentism.” It interprets these three, semi-coded planks as implying a privileged treatment to „Russian-speaking” ethnic groups, renouncing the teaching of Romanian history, and resisting Romanian influence („irredentism”). And it takes equally vehement issue with Lupu’s recent statement (Pro-TV, November 27) about strict observance of Moldova’s permanent status of neutrality and Moldova being a „multiethnic and multicultural country.”

Those parts of Lupu’s platforms read like a desperate attempt to secure Russia’s and the local Communist Party’s support. „Timpul” is almost certainly accurate in its interpretation of Lupu’s planks. This influential newspaper speaks for Romanian-minded Chisinau circles across party lines, including Filat’s latent rival, the Liberal Party of parliament chairman and acting head of state Mihai Ghimpu. With six days to go until the presidential election, „Timpul”‘s assault on Lupu indicates that AEI leaders are seriously considering abandoning Lupu’s presidential candidacy and prolonging Ghimpu’s acting presidency for an undefined period of time, in breach of the admittedly flawed constitution, and pending changes to that document by referemdum.

Thus, Lupu’s tactical rapprochement with Russia is playing into the hands of his rivals within the AEI. His tactics risk squandering his reputation as a Western-oriented politician, favorably regarded in Brussels and other European capitals, and with no personal links to Russia thus far. Unlike the other AEI leaders, Lupu has no personal links to Romania either. He and a few other AEI politicians of Lupu’s generation (now in their early 40s) represent a cultural leap from the post-Soviet era into the European integration era for Moldova. Nevertheless, feeling cornered inside the AEI, Lupu has reached out recklessly close to Russia and the Communists.

Russia would prefer a Moldovan leadership that modifies the existing, unambiguous European orientation by introducing a two-vector policy between Europe and Russia. By the same token, Russia would welcome a Moldovan leadership that sets limits to Romanian influence in Moldova.

Moscow’s optimal solution would be to support a respected Moldovan politician with a European face, who would preside over a two-vector policy. Furthermore, such a Moldovan president would have to operate in alliance with one or several political groups amenable to Russian influence. Moscow apparently hopes that it could embed Lupu into such an arrangement. However, the Kremlin’s attempts to persuade the Moldovan Communist Party or at least a part of it to break the deadlock and support Lupu’s election as president (see EDM, November) have not borne fruit thus far.

There are no pro-Russia elements in the AEI; and few such in the opposition Communist Party’s leadership (which had distanced itself dramatically from Moscow in recent years). All Moldovan political leaders including Communists subscribe to the goal of European integration (despite differences of degree in their understanding of that goal). The Communist Party, however, has switched from a pro-Europe stance to an equidistant stance between Europe and Russia in its electoral rhetoric this year.

While some AEI politicians feel close to Romania, and some are prone to Romanian national irredentism, no significant Moldovan politician is oriented toward Russia. Even among Communist parliamentarians, political Russophiles (as distinct from cultural ones) are a few passive backbenchers. Russian direct political influence in Chisinau had been nil during the nominally Communist Vladimir Voronin’s presidency (2001-2009). Pro-Moscow groups operate outside the Communist Party, on the left fringe of „Russian-speaking” ethnic groups.

However, Chisinau’s intense partisan, factional, and personal rivalries–coupled with the urgency of external economic support to the new government–impel some leaders and groups to reach out not only to the European Union or Romania, but also to Russia. In this situation, presidential aspirants and government leaders responsible for the economy are engaging in tactical fence-mending with Moscow.

Consequently, Moscow sees an opportunity to build political influence in Chisinau for the first time after 1991. It has started this effort almost from scratch in recent months. The Kremlin and the Russian government are approaching Moldovan political groups and key contestants for power, seeking to shape the outcome and create a basis for working with a post-crisis government. However, the Communists are not readily amenable, and Lupu is overplaying his tactical hand.


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 by Bill Schorr, 05 nov 09


2 decembrie 2009 Posted by | caricaturi / comics, Geopolitica, Intelo | , , , , , , , , | Lasă un comentariu

02/dec/2009 Obama: declaraţie de fond privind viitorul campaniei în Afganistan

Soluţia administraţiei Obama privind campania din Afganistan

Ieri, 1 decembrie a.c., într-un discurs programat a devoala soluţia administraţiei Obama la problemele din Afganistan, preşedintele SUA a anunţat dimensiunile de perspectivă ale „efortului american” în zonă: sporirea cu 30.000 de oameni a corpurilor armate americane şi, în speranţa unei evoluţii pozitive a campaniei, posibilitatea retragerii din zonă, după o perioadă de timp de minimum 18 luni (în iulie 2011). După ce a făcut o introducere „istorică” a dosarului afgan (începînd de la ziua fatidică de 11 septembrie 2001), precizînd că aceste eforturi din Afganistan şi Pakistan sînt „în interesul vital al Americii”, preşedintele Barack Obama a spus că trupele americane din Afganistan vor spori numeric spre 100.000 de oameni în primăvara anului 2010, iar forţele aliaţilor din NATO vor creşte de la nivelul actual (40 000 de oameni) spre 45-50 000. În context fie spus, este de aşteptat ca şi România – odată încheiate aceste alegeri prezidenţiale – să pună în discuţie o eventuală sporire a prezenţei sale în Afganistan. (Adrian Cioroianu)

*   *   *

The text of President Barack Obama’s speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point on December 1, as issued by the White House

“Good evening.  To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our Armed Services, and to my fellow Americans:  I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan — the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion.  It’s an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point — where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.
To address these important issues, it’s important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place.  We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people.  They struck at our military and economic nerve centers.  They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station.  Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.
As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda — a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda’s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban — a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.
Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them — an authorization that continues to this day. (text integral)

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by Kal, The Economist 26 nov 09

2 decembrie 2009 Posted by | Geopolitica, Intelo, Istorie | , , , , , , | Lasă un comentariu

02/dec/2009 Criza actuală, între stânga şi dreapta (III)

Timp de 7 zile, un dialog de 15 Q & A între Adrian Păunescu (poet, ex-senator socialist) şi Adrian Cioroianu (profesor de Istorie, ex-senator liberal) despre rădăcinile şi “morala” crizei economice actuale. Acest dialog informal (întrebările aparţin dlui A.P.) a fost prilejuit de o anchetă a revistei pe care dl Păunescu o conduce – EURAST.

Ziua 3/7

AP: 4. Are ceva în comun criza capitalismului cu criza socialismului?

AC: Nu (dacă e vorba de socialismul răsăritean de tip sovietic). Nu putem compara merele şi perele. Acel socialism era o fantasmă. Capitalismul e ultraconcret (şi în bine, şi în rău). Acel socialism nu s-a putut autoregla, pe când capitalismul, cu toate păcatele sale, se autoreglează de câteva sute de ani. Poate că şi crizele, cum spuneam mai sus, fac parte din aceeaşi dinamică a autoreglării capitalismului.

AP: 5. Dacă expresia tipică a crizei de astăzi este recesiunea, de ce să fie obligate ţările fără o dezvoltare economică semnificativă să suporte aceeaşi criză cu ţările blocate de plusul lor de producţie?

AC: Pentru că globalizarea nu e vorbă goală. Ţările medii dezvoltate nu pot scăpa de criză decât dacă-şi sporesc consumul intern (precum China, India sau Brazilia de azi). Dacă însă depind de exporturi sau importuri (vezi Rusia sau ţările UE), nu pot scăpa de criză. În plus, această criză, repet, nu mai este neapărat una a surplusului de producţie.

2 decembrie 2009 Posted by | Intelo | , , , , , , , , | Lasă un comentariu