09/iun/2010 Politica externă a Rusiei în epoca postsovietică (4/4)

Russian foreign policy within post- soviet era

 Irina Gucianu

(1/4); (2/4); (3/4); (4/4)

The leaders of the new Russia

Regarding the leaders from Kremlin, just as the famous dolls Matryoshka, they seem to be ‘born’ one from another – Initially, Yeltsin was Gorbachev’s choice (for a soviet career, indeed); Putin was then Yeltsin’s choice, and Medvedev was –how else – Putin’s choice.[1] All of these three successive leaders, as of 1991 up to nowadays, followed the same geopolitical desiderata, but instead they used different means (and obviously with different results). Although at first sight, Yeltsin’s office seems to be substantially different from the one of his successor, few are Putin’s actions based upon which there was at least one action pertaining to Yeltsin (the doctrine of the ‘close neighborhood’, the attraction of the former republics within CIS or the use of gas as a weapon). Nevertheless, there was a difference in style between them and this thing is for sure.  On the other hand, Putin had the ’bad chance’ to witness the emergence of leaders of pro-western ideas, following the colored revolutions in Georgia, (the rose revolution), Ukraine (the orange revolution) or Kirgizstan (the tulip revolution).[2] Another ‘bad chance’ – should we call it this way – that Putin had, was to be the counterpart of George W. Bush – who, most likely, inspired the above-mentioned leaders (from Georgia, Ukraine).

The similarities hide behind a warning

‘Nowadays, at almost two decades since USSR collapsed, the dominant feeling of Kremlin leaders, as of the entire Russia as well, is that the West had unilaterally exploited – and without being actually fair – the difficulties that the new heir of the Soviet Union coped with, as it strived as much as possible to gain a geopolitical advantage into the Eastern Europe’.[3]

Taking into account such premises, the paradigm that shall be used for guiding the Russian policies, regarding the peripheral countries, shall be the one of maintaining these countries away from any perspective of accession into the North Atlantic Treaty or into any other connections with the western countries and, to this regard, Russia uses its alibi of ‘frozen conflicts’ whenever it is necessary to moderate the aspirations.[4] In essence, the post-soviet evolution of Russia highlights the everlasting ambitions of the Kremlin leaders – to be a super-power. We are about to see what the limits of such a pursuit are.

 

Bibliography:

Brzezinski, Zbigniew Marea Dilema: A domina sau a conduce, Ed. Scripta, Bucureşti, 2005

Cioroianu, Adrian Geopolitica Matrişăi, Ed. Curtea Veche, Bucuresti, 2009

Riasanovski, Nicholas V., O istorie a Rusiei, Ed. Institutului European, 2001

Sturmer, Michel, Putin şi noua Rusie, Ed. Litera International, Bucureşti

The Economist: www.economist.com

Stratfor: http://www.stratfor.com

 

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[1] Ibidem, p.153

[2] Ibidem

[3] Sturmer, Michel, Putin si noua Rusie, ed. Litera International, Bucuresti, 2009, p. 22

[4] Cioroianu, Adrian Geopolitica Matrioşkăi, ed. Curtea Veche, Bucuresti, 2009, p.143

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